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BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code 78-2-2(3)(i), in that this case involves a conviction of
a first degree felony.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Should the Defendant's knife and bag of clothing, seized

without a warrant from the trailer in which he was residing, have
been suppressed?

The standard of review is whether it clearly

appears that the lower court was in error in its factual assessment
underlying a decision to deny a suppression motion. State v. Ashe,
745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987).
2. Was the Defendant deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel when counsel, at the court's encouragement, proceeded in
taking over the examination of witnesses from the Defendant after
counsel stated he was not prepared to proceed?

The standard of

review is whether counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner and whether the outcome of trial would probably
have been different but for the error.

State v. Geary, 707 P.2d
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645.
3.

Does the appointment of a part-time city attorney and

prosecutor to represent an indigent defendant constitute a conflict
of interest and deny the defendant due process?

The standard of

review is strictly a determination of constitutional law and
judicial administration by this court.
4. Does the prosecuting attorney's reference to Defendant and
three co-defendants, in closing argument, as
constitute reversible error?

"four mad dogs"

The standard for review is whether

misconduct occurred and whether the jury was probably influenced
by the remarks.
5.

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984).

Did the trial court err in permitting evidence of prior

bad acts of the Defendant?

The standard for review is whether the

trial court abused its discretion.

State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350

(Utah 1985) .
6.

Did the trial court's decision to permit the jury to

deliberate for 13 1/2 hours through the night after a full fourth
day of trial deprive the Defendant of the full benefits of his
right to a jury?

The standard of review regarding issues of jury

deliberation is abuse of discretion. State v. Lactad, 761 P.2d 23.
7.

Was the jury instruction regarding jury deliberation

improper as being unduly coercive of dissenting jurors?

Because

the correctness of a jury instruction is an issue of law only, no
deference is granted to the trial court.

Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d

131, 133 (Utah 1989).
8. Was there insufficient evidence to support the conviction
2
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of aggravated assault on Richard Anderson?

The standard of review

is whether there is some evidence from which findings of all the
requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made.

State v.

Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985).
9.
Defendant

Was it improper for the court to order an indigent
to reimburse the county

including attorney's fees?

for all costs of defense

The standard of review is abuse of

discretion.

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The interpretation of the following constitutional provisions,
statutes, and rules is determinative of the issues involved:
Issue 1.

4th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 14 of Constitution of Utah

Issue 2.

6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah

Issue 3.

6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah

Issue 4.

Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 3.4(e)

A lawyer shall not:
(e) . . . In trial, allude to any matter that the
lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or
that will not be supported by admissible evidence,
assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except
when testifying as a witness, or state a personal
opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a
civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused.
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8
3
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(a) . . .
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor
to express his or her personal belief or opinion as
to the truth or falsity of any testimony or
evidence or the guilt of the defendant.
(c)
The prosecutor shall not use arguments
calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of
the jury.
Issue 5.

Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence

(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a
person's character or a trait of his character is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that he
acted in conformity therewith on a particular
occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a
pertinent trait of his character offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same;
(2) . . .
(3) . . .
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts.
Evidence of
other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
Rule 405, Utah Rules of Evidence
Methods of Proving Character
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which
evidence of character or a trait of character of a
person is admissible, proof may be made by
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the
form of an opinion. On cross-examination, inquiry
is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct.
In cases in
which character or a trait of character of a person
is essential element of a charge, claim, or
defense, proof may also be made of specific
4
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instances of his conduct.
Issue 6.

6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah

Issue 7.

6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah

Issue 8.

Utah Code 76-5-103

(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and
he:
(a) . . .
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or other means or force
likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury.
Utah Code 76-5-102
(1) Assault is:
(a) . . .
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another; or
(c) . . .
Utah Code 76-10-506
Every person, except those persons described in
Section 76-10-503, who, not in necessary self
defense in the presence of two or more persons,
draws or exhibits any dangerous weapon in an angry
and threatening manner or unlawfully uses the same
in any fight or quarrel is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Issue 9.

Utah Code 77-32a-3

The court shall not include in the judgment a
sentence that a defendant pay costs unless the
defendant is or will be able to pay them.
In
determining the amount and method of payment of
costs, the court shall take account of the
5
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financial resources of the defendant and the nature
of the burden that payment of costs will impose and
that restitution be the first priority.
6th Amendment of U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 of Constitution of Utah

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
According

to

Eddie

Apadaca,

one

of

the

State's

three

eyewitnesses, the Defendant, along with eight other employees, in
the evening of October 25, 1989, were in the camp of the Western
Brine Shrimp Company on the northwestern side of the Great Salt
Lake.

During the late evening hours, one of the crew, William

Cummins, who stayed in trailer number three with Billy Cayer and
the Defendant, went to trailer number two and asked Eddie Apadaca
to come over to his trailer to talk. A roommate of his, Cabututan
was already there.

Cummins accused him of telling Don Brown, the

Defendant, who had been with the crew approximately a week, that
he was a foreman. All four in the trailer had had some alcohol to
drink.

Another member of the crew, from his own trailer, Ray

Cabututan got upset with him for not having helped him with some
work, started hitting him, and threw a sharpening stone at him,
hitting him on the head.
Eddie ran back to his trailer.

A short time later, Cayer,

Cummins, Cabututan, and Defendant went to trailer number two.
Cabututan had nunchukas.
and the four who entered.

Mike, the victim, jumped between Eddie
Cummins said to get the hunting knife

from Mike's pocket. Michael was pushed back and drew his knife (T
6
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211:113). At that time, Brown, the Defendant, had a knife out also
(T 211:17). Mike dropped his knife and Defendant folded his up and
put it away.

The Defendant, Cummins and Cabututan escorted Mike

out of the trailer.

Cayer remained with Apadaca.

Cayer swung at Apadaca a few times until the Defendant came
back in, told Cayer to leave him alone and then told Apadaca to get
his things and leave. Meanwhile, Cabututan had come in and taken
Mike's knife from the bed and left.
When he exited trailer number two, Apadaca saw Mike on the
ground in front of the door and Cummins and Cabututan kicking and
hitting him (T 218:14-17).

Cayer was a short ways away.

Cummins

struck Apadaca as he came out and knocked him down (T 219:4), and
when he got up Cabututan stepped in front of him with a crescent
wrench in his hand (T 220:3-10).

He ran out of camp, and part way

up a hill, glanced back and could see Mike still lying on the
ground with people around him but couldn't tell how many (T 222:48).

The only light was from windows of the trailers.

running.

He kept

In the morning, he saw Anderson & Galardo and rode back

to near the camp with them to wait for law enforcement officers to
arrive.
According to Richard Anderson, who shared trailer number one
with Galardo and Tilley, he was awakened that night, put on his
clothes and looked out the door (T 314:22).

When he opened the

door, he saw one man on the ground and four men around him.

The

Defendant, holding the crescent wrench, pulled his hand back and
asked him if he wanted some of it too (T 319:10-13).
7
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Anderson

stepped back in, shut the door and had a discussion with his three
roommates.
After reopening the door, he saw Cabututan attempt to stab
Mike with a knife and then hit him in the head with the crescent
wrench (T 327:23-25). He saw Cabututan, Cummins and the Defendant
hit and kick him. He didn't see Defendant at any time with a knife
or hit Mike with the wrench.

He admitted that at preliminary

hearing he had said he saw silhouettes around the man on the ground
(T 414:18-23).
After the fight, Mike got up, went into his trailer and washed
himself off. Early the next morning, Anderson heard a knock on the
door.

Mike was sitting on a pallet outside the door, asked them

to call 911, that he couldn't breathe and wanted a drink of water.
After a drink of water, he collapsed and died.
Eric Tilley, the third State's eyewitness, also looked out the
south door of trailer one (T 482:8) saw Mike on the ground with
three persons around him, Cayer and Cabututan, and the third being
either Cummins or the Defendant, but uncertain.
Defendant

had

similar physical

characteristics

Cummins and
(T 483:5-14).

According to him, and contrary to Anderson, the door of the trailer
was shut after that and he didn't see any more of the fight. Also,
contrary to Anderson, the fight lasted 10 to 15 minutes (T 490:3)
rather than 45 minutes and he went to the south end of the trailer
when Richard reopened the door (T 491:3-5) . The fight was over and
Mike was standing there.
The Defendant testified that he went over to where Cummins and
8
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Mike were fighting and Cummins asked him to get Mike's knife, and
he went down but couldn't find it (T 801:9-14).

Cabututan had the

crescent wrench and had jumped in and was hitting and kicking Mike
(T 802:18-21).

He broke up the fight by dragging Cummins off of

Mike (T 803:10-21).

The fight started because Cummins was upset

about Mike having cut his buddy, Cayer, with his knife (T 801:1424), a matter substantiated by Apadaca (T 283:11-19).
According to the medical examiner, the cause of death was
multiple blunt force injuries to the head and torso (T 538:5). Two
of the injuries were with a wrench (T 538:15).
three cuts.

There were also

There was no specific injury that could be identified

as the lethal blow (T 549:2).
The Defendant together with Cummins, Cabututan, and Cayer were
arrested

and

removed

from

camp.

Thereafter,

a

search of

Defendant's trailer was made at which time a pink laundry bag
containing a pants and shirt of his were seized. The next day, his
folding knife in the same trailer was seized.

Both seizures

occurred without a warrant. A state lab serologist testified that
the pants and shirt both showed positive indications of blood but
insufficient for further identification (T 622:13-14).

The knife

likewise had indications of blood but insufficient for further
identification (T 649:1-4).

The boots taken from Defendant when

he was arrested tested positive for human blood but could not be
typed (T 631:5-10).

Clothing of other defendants showed antigens

consistent with the victims blood type.

The defense introduced a

picture taken a day after the arrest showing a cut to one of
9
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Defendant's fingers which Defendant sustained earlier the day of
the fight while loading shrimp eggs (T 781:25-783:25).
Prior to trial, the Defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence and a motion to dismiss his court-appointed attorney. The
first motion was denied and the latter was granted with the
appointed attorney available for assistance. The trials of the codefendants were severed with Defendant's case being tried last.
During the trial, when the Defendant experienced great difficulty
in cross-examining the State's witnesses, counsel was requested to
proceed with the cross-examination and the rest of the trail. The
jury deliberated for 13 1/2 hours after a full fourth day of trial
despite counsel's request that they be permitted to rest.

The

Defendant was found guilty of second degree homicide of Mike
Ramirez

and

aggravated

assault

of

Richard

Anderson.

From

conviction of those charges he has appealed.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant's knife and bag of clothing, seized after his

arrest without a warrant, should have been suppressed.
II.

The Defendant was deprived of the effective assistance of

counsel when counsel proceeded in taking over the examination of
the witnesses from the Defendant despite stating that he was not
prepared to proceed.
III.

The

appointment

of

a part-time

city

attorney

and

prosecutor to represent the Defendant constitutes a conflict of
interest and denied the Defendant due process.
10
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IV. The prosecuting attorney's misconduct in referring to the
Defendant, and three co-defendants, in closing argument as "four
mad dogs" constitutes reversible error.
V.

The trial court erred in permitting evidence of prior bad

acts of the Defendant.
VI.

The trial court's decision to permit the

jury to

deliberate for 13 1/2 hours through the night after a full fourth
day of the trial deprived the Defendant of the full benefits of his
right to a jury.
VII.

Jury instruction 50 was unduly coercive in encouraging

dissenting jurors to compromise a conviction.
VIII.

There was insufficient evidence to support the conviction

of an aggravated assault on Richard Anderson.
IX.
Defendant

It was improper for the court to order an indigent
to reimburse the county

for all costs of defense

including attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT'S KNIFE AND BAG OF CLOTHING, SEIZED AFTER HIS ARREST
WITHOUT A WARRANT, SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED.
The Defendant and three co-defendants were arrested October
26, 1989 and handcuffed at 8:35 AM (T(A) (suppression hearing on
January 24), p. 23:7).

They were placed in a trailer different

from the one in which they'd been living and kept there until a
jail van took them at 11:15 AM (T(A)22-23).

Several officers

initially went through trailer number three but no weapons were
11
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observed (T(A)17:4).

Officers at two other times entered that

trailer to get medicine and cigarettes for the prisoners (T(A)18
& 75). The trailer was entered two more times, once to obtain a
ground to ground radio to communicate with one of the owner's of
the business enterprise and trailer who lived in Salt Lake City and
the second time for a thorough search of the premises at which time
a pink bag belonging to the Defendant was seized (T(A)81:3).

The

bag contained Defendant's clothing including a pair of pants and
a sweatshirt and both had "positive indications" of blood but there
was no identification as to whether it was human or as to type (T.
622).
There were four trailers on the premises.

Trailer number

three was stipulated to be the trailer that was the living quarters
of three of the co-defendants, Cummins, Cayer, and Brown, and in
which they kept their personal property (T(A)40). Perishable food
items were primarily kept in the refrigerator in trailer three
(T(A)65:25) for all the residents of the camp and the ground to
ground radios were kept there (T(A)64:5) but the common practice
was to knock before going in someone else's trailer (T(A)66:13),
there was a privacy interest (T(A)66:17), and they wouldn't go in
someone else's trailer unless they were there (T(A)70:9).
Prior to the search, the officers contacted Mr. Bentzley in
Salt Lake City by radio, who gave them permission to search the
premises (T(A)83:13).

The search was conducted at approximately

1:00 PM (T(A)43:8).

During the earlier entries into the trailer,

the

specifically

officers

had

observed,

among

12
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those

items

eventually seized, a pasteboard box with blood on it, tennis shoes,
a crescent wrench, and hip waders (T(A)29:17-30:11 and 75:1676:22).

The pink bag with clothing and white folding knife, one

of three knives found and seized at the scene, were not identified
as having been observed prior to the thorough search conducted that
afternoon. This particular knife was observed and examined during
the search

(T(A)82) but wasn't retrieved until the next day

(T(A)94:6).

The prosecutor admitted that no warrant was used

(T(A)5:8).

Nor was any magistrate ever called about obtaining a

search warrant (T(A)94:9-11).
The trial court denied the motion to suppress on three bases.
That the search and seizure had been: 1) incident to an arrest
(T(A)119-120), 2) exigent circumstances of distance, a homicide,
dissipation of blood, access of other employees to the premises,
rain and snow nearby, and a great deal of agitation and distress
(T(A) 120-121), 3) plain view (T(A)121), and 4) consent by the owner
(T(A)122) .
The warrantless search should not have been sustained on any
of these four grounds.
arrest.

It can't be justified as incident to the

The prisoners were arrested and handcuffed and placed in

a separate trailer 4 1/2 hours before the search was conducted and
were taken from the scene by a jail van at least 1 1/2 hours
beforehand.

A search for weapons had already been performed.

Nor can the search be sustained on the basis of exigent
circumstances. None of the circumstances articulated by the trial
judge were such as to make a search without a warrant imperative.
13
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While there was a substantial distance to town, the jail van had
been called out to the scene, a co-owner of the enterprise had been
contacted and no showing was made that a warrant could not have
been obtained. The fact of a homicide having been committed or any
agitation or distress it may have caused the officers has never
been viewed as circumstances in and of themselves excusing the
requirement of a search warrant.

No showing was made that blood

dissipates more quickly than the time required to secure a warrant,
employee access to trailer three could have been restricted by one
or more of the numerous officers at the scene, and there was no
showing that the wet weather conditions would have affected any of
the contents of the trailer.
These "exigent circumstances" are certainly not of the type
recognized in State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1987) where there
was an expectation that a drug transaction would be completed
within minutes, a person looked out a window as the officers
approached and the court concluded that the officers were not in
a position to secure a warrant.
The exceptions are "xjealously and carefully drawn,'
and there must be a v showing by those who seek exemption
. .. that the exigencies of the situation made [the
search] imperative.'"
State v. Ashe, at 1258 quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed 2d 564.
In this particular case, a telephone search warrant was not
attempted.

The availability of such warrants under Utah Code 77-

23-4(2) in this state makes this case similar to that of State v.
Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988) where there was sufficient
14
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time to obtain such a warrant but no attempt was made to do so.
The trial court further justifies the warrantless search under
the plain view doctrine.

The Defendant concedes for the sake of

argument that the earlier entries were valid for weapons searchf
obtaining medication and cigarettes at request of the occupantsf
and to obtain a ground radio.

However, of the items seized, only

a cardboard box with blood, tennis shoes, crescent wrench, and hip
waders had been noted by the officers and not the items identified
with the Defendant, the pink clothes bag and folding knife. These
were not observed until the subsequent entry made specifically for
the purpose of search and seizure of evidence. Only the four items
observed by the officers during their earlier entries into the
trailer would be permitted under the plain view exception to the
search warrant requirement.

State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah

1986).
Further, as to the knife seized the following day, Kelly makes
clear in footnote 1 that plain view may not be used as a pretext
for a warrantless search and seizure where the officers know in
advance that an item will be present and use that knowledge as
justification for a warrantless search and seizure.
Finally, the justification of consent must fail. The trailer
was the residence of the Defendant and two of the co-defendants.
Though in terms of employment, the relationship between the owner
and the Defendant was employer-employee, the relationship with
regard to the trailer was one of land-lord tenant.

The general

rule, recognized in State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64 (Utah 1967) is that
15
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the consent of an owner or landlordf is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless search of the tenant's residence.
Though trailer number three was also used to store perishable
foods for other members of the crew and the ground to ground
radios, State's witness Anderson testified that there was a privacy
interest, the common practice was to knock before going in and that
they wouldn't go in someone else's trailer unless they were there.
The rule requiring a warrant is not otherwise merely because
the lessor has by express agreement or by implication reserved a
right to enter for some special or limited purpose.

State v.

Johnson, 701 P.2d 239, aff'd 716 P.2d 1288 (Id. 1985).
An owner who stores goods on premises may have an implied
consent to enter at reasonable times to exercise dominion over
goods but that does not give the owner carte blanche to consent to
a police search of the premises. People v. Escudero, 592 P.2d 312
(Cal. 1979).
The seizure of the Defendant's clothes bag with the pants and
shirt therein and his folding knife should have been suppressed
under either the state or the federal constitutions.

II.
THE DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL PROCEEDED IN TAKING OVER THE EXAMINATION OF
THE WITNESSES FROM THE DEFENDANT DESPITE STATING THAT HE WAS NOT
PREPARED TO PROCEED.
The Defendant

filed a Motion For Dismissal of Attorney

(Addendum, Exhibit A) a week before trial on February 5, 1990. At
a hearing on that Motion on February 8, Mr. Willmore, the court16
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appointed attorney, stated that the breakdown in the relationship
began with disagreement over certain defenses.

"I felt that Mr.

Brown shouldn't and then Mr. Brown made the decision that he wanted
to do it this way, in his way, and that's it."
hearing), 13:18-21).

(T(B)(Feb. 8

The Defendant stated he wanted to act as his

own attorney (T(B)14:15-19). After further questioning, the court
granted Defendant's Motion but required that Mr. Willmore be
available during trial for consultation and assist on the selection
of the jury (T(B)22:1-14).

The Defendant further requested that

Mr. Willmore make the opening statement and closing argument for
him (T(B)26:24-25).
During the course of the trial, the Defendant at times had
difficulty conducting the cross-examination of the State's first
witness, Eddie Apadaca

(Example: T 255-256).

He was quite

ineffective in cross-examining the next witness, Richard Anderson,
gave up in his attempt at cross-examination, and Mr. Willmore asked
permission to ask further questions in areas not yet covered (T
386:4-8).

During the ensuing conference in chambers, the court

granted permission for the trial to be turned over to Tom Willmore
(T 397).
proceed.

However, the court asked him if he was prepared to
He responded, "I wasn't prepared to question Richard

Anderson and Eric Tilley, but I will do it." (T 397:23-25).

The

court mentions that Willmore was at the preliminary hearing and has
a transcript. Willmore responded:

"I've gone over it all, but as

far as being prepared to the point where I normally am, what I
would like to be, I am not.

But I will go ahead, if that's what
17
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Don wants." (T 398:6-9). Neither the court nor Willmore suggested
a recess despite Willmore's statement of inadequate preparation for
these suddenly changed circumstances and court immediately went
back into session.
There was a need for we 11-prepared, close, and extensive
cross-examination of the three state's witnesses who had been
members of the crew at the camp. Substantial discrepancies between
the witnesses as to Defendant's degree of involvement in the fight
had been developed

in an extensive preliminary

hearing, the

transcript of which filled four volumes and 949 pages.

This was

in addition to voluminous hand written statements and transcribed
interviews of each of these witnesses and partial transcriptions
of their testimony at the trials of the co-defendants that preceded
Defendant's.
The

exact

conduct

of

the

Defendant

observed

by

these

witnesses, the opportunity to observe from distances, in dim
lighting, with lines of sight cut off by doorways and trailers, and
the point in time in the progress of the fight in which any conduct
of Defendant's was observed were crucial to Defendant's claim of
peripheral involvement in the altercation of trying to locate and
take from the victim a knife he was purportedly carrying and that
if he was guilty of anything, it should have been of one of the
lesser included offenses.
The Defendant further alleges that due to lack of sufficient
preparation and despite Defendant's request, counsel declined to
call one of the co-defendants, Ray Cabututan, as a witness. In his
18
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own earlier trial, Cabututan had testified: "I had the wrench.
Nobody had the wrench but me.

You know, that's what they're

fabricating." (Addendum, Exhibit B. p. 270 of Cabututan's trial
transcript).

Cabututan, in his trial, had alleged self-defense

with the wrench when attacked by the victim with a knife.
In evaluating the issue of adequacy of counsel under these
circumstances, it should first be emphasized that this was not a
case where the Defendant was manipulating his right to counsel for
purposes of delay and disruption. State v. Johnson, 651 P. 2d 247
(Wash. App. 1982).

It appears that the Defendant had some basic

disagreements with his counsel as to what defenses should be
presented and he felt he could do a better job in getting his point
of view across.

He fell flat on his face and his attorney was

unprepared to step in at that precise moment.

The trial should

have been adjourned, at least until the next day, to permit his
counsel to make adequate preparation. The constitutional right to
have the assistance of counsel carries with it a reasonable time
for consultation and preparation.

State v. Barker, 667 P. 2d 108

(Wash. App. 1983).
Murder in the second degree requires a showing of an intent
to cause serious bodily injury or, with depraved indifference
knowingly engaging in conduct which created a grave risk of death.
The Defendant was entitled to and obtained instructions on the
lesser included offenses of manslaughter, negligent homicide,
aggravated assault, and assault.

Careful, well-prepared cross-

examination would probably have shown that at most, the Defendant's
19
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conduct was reckless, if aware of the risk of death, hence
manslaughter, or was an intentional infliction of serious bodily
injury, hence aggravated assault.

Had Cabututan been called, his

testimony regarding his sole possession of the wrench during the
fight would probably have affected the verdict on the homicide
charge and exonerated the Defendant on the charge of aggravated
assault against Anderson.
Regardless of the Defendant's role in placing his counsel in
the awkward position of having to proceed immediately though illprepared to do so, the Defendant has been deprived of effective
assistance of counsel if counsel rendered a deficient performance
in some demonstrable manner and the outcome of trial would probably
have been different but for the error.
645.

State v. Geary, 707 P. 2d

In this case, the error was in counsel failing to ask for

adjournment to be able to make adequate preparation despite the
court's encouragement to immediately go forward as well as the
court requiring counsel to immediately proceed.

III.
THE APPOINTMENT OF A PART-TIME CITY ATTORNEY AND PROSECUTOR
TO REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT CONSTITUTES A CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND
DENIED THE DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS.
Prior to trial, the Defendant felt that Thomas Willmore was
not representing his best interests and filed a pro se Motion For
Dismissal of Attorney (Ct. Red. 242-245).

While Mr. Willmore's

status as a city attorney and prosecutor was not stated in the
motion and was probably unknown to the Defendant at the time, that
20
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situation came to light during the selection of the jury.
During the questioning of Mr. Munns, Mr. Willmore identifies
himself as the prosecutor for Garland City and that the prior year
he prosecuted a member of Mr. Munns family and then proceeded to
inquire if Mr. Munns had any ill feelings towards him (T. 84-86).
It does not appear that the Utah courts have addressed the
issue of whether

a city prosecuting

attorney can or should

represent a defendant being prosecuted by the county or state.
While courts have been unanimous in prohibiting a prosecutor from
defending a client from prosecution by the same governmental entity
that he is employed by, there is also some authority that parttime prosecutors for state governmental subdivisions should also
not be defending criminal cases.

Professional Responsibility of

the Criminal Lawyer, John Wesley Hall, Jr., 1987, The Lawyer's
Cooperative Publishing Company, p. 405; Howerton v. State, 640 P.2d
566 (Okl. Crim. 1982) .
Among the reasons stated in Goodman v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905
(4th Cir. 1965) for reversal of a conviction where a part-time
district attorney was appointed to represent an indigent defendant
was that effective representation may mandate attacking state laws
which it is prosecutor's function and perhaps sworn duty to uphold,
and may require an attack on methods used by law enforcement which
he seeks to enforce and justify in the prosecution function. These
conflicts are as real whether the attorney works for the state, a
county, or a municipality.
An additional problem, not stated in Goodman is the appearance
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of a conflict to the unsophisticated lay defendant. At a minimum,
the employment in a prosecutorial capacity should be disclosed to
the defendant in advance so that he can make a reasoned decision.
While it is impossible for the Defendant to prove that if
Thomas Willmore was not employed as city attorney and prosecutor
for Garland City, he would have provided more effective assistance
of counsel, he does assert that such may have been a factor in some
of the deficiencies pointed out in his Motion For Dismissal of
Attorney (Addendum, Exhibit A ) .

IV.
THE PROSECUTING ATTORNEY'S MISCONDUCT IN REFERRING TO THE
DEFENDANT, AND THREE CO-DEFENDANTS, IN CLOSING ARGUMENT AS "FOUR
MAD DOGS" CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The prosecuting attorney, in closing argument, stated as
follows:

"There isn't one of us here who knows how he would react

in a situation like that with four mad dogs out there beating on
somebody. (T. 911:20-22)

Objection was made by defense counsel.

(T. 912:2) Use of this inflammatory language was in derogation of
the

Code

of

Professional

Responsibility,

Rule

3.4(e), which

prohibits the prosecuting attorney from making expressions of
personal opinion of guilt and the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal
Justice 3 - 5.8 (2d ed. 1982) which prohibits the same as well as
use of argument "calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices
of the jury."
The leading Utah cases dealing with prosecutorial misconduct
provide a two-step evaluation process; whether misconduct occurred
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and whether the jury was probably influenced by the remarks. State
v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Ut. 1984), State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422
(Ut. 1973)-

The use of the epithet, "four mad dogs", while not

repeated is the type of phrase that penetrates the mind and
understanding of a listener and is specifically designed to inflame
the passions or prejudices of the jury-

It is a stronger term than

the terms "crud" and "child molester" in Patterson v. State, 747
P.2d 535 (Alaska 1987) and "yo-yo", "stupid", "thief" and "crook"
in State v. Diaz, 668 P.2d 326 (N.M. App. 1983).

Nor need bad

faith be shown. State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1255 (Ut. 1988). Step
one is clearly met.
As to step two, the jury was probably influenced by the
remark.

State v. Troy, 688 P. 2d 483, 486, points out that in a

case with less compelling proof, such as this, the Court will more
closely scrutinize the conduct, and that if there is conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing interpretations,
"there is a greater likelihood that they

[the jury] will be

improperly influenced through remarks of counsel.
The degree of Defendant's involvement in the assault on the
deceased was strongly in dispute in this case, with the testimony
of three State's eye-witnesses varying greatly, and the Defendant's
conduct being susceptible to many interpretations represented by
a full range of lesser included offenses submitted to the jury.
The final conclusion of the jury after 13 1/2 straight hours of
deliberation through the night could, in the exhaustion of the
morning hours, have been swayed by this mind-grabbing label put
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forth by the prosecutor.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF PRIOR BAD ACTS
OF THE DEFENDANT.
During

the

redirect

examination

of

one

of

the

State's

witnesses, Richard Anderson, the court permitted the prosecuting
attorney, over defense counsel's objection, to inquire as to an
alleged statement of the Defendant exhibiting belligerency by the
Defendant toward a member of the crew other than the victim of the
assault in this case.

That evidence was offered to prove the

aggressive character of the Defendant and is prohibited under Rules
404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The testimony elicited was as follows:
Q. And do you recall what Brown [Defendant] told you
regarding that altercation? [T. 432:18] . . .[objection
interposed]
A. He was - his - his statement was, I'd like to see Mr.
- or Ed take a dip in the lake and not come back up. [T.
433:9]
Q. Okay. And do you recall approximately when that was?
A. No. Earlier in the week or something.
Monday or Tuesday or somewhere around there.
This

testimony

was

permitted

by

the

You know,

Court

because

the

Defendant, acting pro se, had earlier asked this same witness, on
cross-examination:
Q. Have you ever - have you ever seen at any time out
there when working with Don Brown that he ever became
belligerent or had any trouble with anybody? Irm talking
about Don Brown. I'm not talking about they or them.
A.

He had a problem with one of the workers.
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Ed.

[T.

377:21-25] [Thereafter Defendant confers with his courtappointed attorney and drops this line of questioning.]
Under Rule 404(a)(1), evidence of a pertinent trait of the
accused's character can be offered by the prosecution only to rebut
evidence of the same offered by the accused.

The Defendant was

notably unsuccessful in his attempt to elicit evidence of his
peacefulness

from this State's witness so that there was no

character evidence to rebut.

Nor was the character of the

Defendant an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense
permitting such evidence under Rule 404(b).

State v. Miller, 709

P.2d 350 (Ut. 1985).
Even if character evidence would be permissible under Rule
404, such evidence would have to be limited to reputation or
opinion.

Under Rule 405(a) inquiry as to specific instances is

permitted only on cross-examination, not on re-direct.

Nor would

such method of proving character be admissible under Rule 405(b)
where the character trait of the defendant was not an essential
element of a charge, claim or defense.

State v. Miller, 709 P.2d

350 (Ut. 1985).
In this case the trial court misperceived Rule 404 to permit
evidence of specific instances of Defendant's conduct even where
there was no evidence to rebut, permitting the prosecutor to use
the Defendant's blundering attempts at cross-examination as a
pretext.
Nor is this harmless error given the Defendant's minimal
participation in the assault, if any, compared to the two primary
protagonists, William Cummins and Ray Cabututan, the jury's lengthy
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deliberation of 13 1/2 hours, and the highly prejudicial nature of
the alleged statement.

VI.
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO PERMIT THE JURY TO
DELIBERATE FOR 13 1/2 HOURS THROUGH THE NIGHT AFTER A FULL FOURTH
DAY OF THE TRIAL DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF THE FULL BENEFITS OF HIS
RIGHT TO A JURY.
The jury began its deliberation at approximately 5:15 PM on
the fourth day of the trial. (T. 940:2) At 3:35 AM defense counsel
made a motion that the jury be allowed to rest and come back in the
morning on the grounds that they'd been deliberating for 10 hours
after a full day of trial and must be tired.

The prosecutor

objected to them being separated and suggested the court would have
to place them in a motel.

The court denied the motion but said

he'd find out if they'd arrived at a verdict. (T. 942-943)
An hour later, at 4:30 AM, the court convened and the bailiff
reported the jury had said they were moving along and shouldn't be
much longer. At 6:45 AM the jury returned with a verdict of guilty
as charged.
The Defendant is entitled to a trial by jury which includes
an independent decision by each of the jurors as to the Defendant's
guilt or innocence.

While the court is given wide discretion

regarding the length of deliberation, that discretion is abused if
the Defendant is deprived of the considered judgment of each juror.
To believe that the entire jury could remain engaged in the
deliberation process for 13 1/2 hours after a full fourth day of
the trial stretches credulity.

It is unreasonable to believe that
26
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all the jurors could have remained alert for that length of time.
The memory and analytical skills of the jurors would certainly
begin to fade and the wills of any minority jurors would be easily
overborne after that length of time.

To merely inquire after ten

hours if the jury had a verdict and continue the process for an
additional three hours, upon word from the bailiff that they were
moving along and shouldn't be much longer, is to give too much
deference to those on the jury that wanted to get the job over and
done with at the expense of the Defendant.
In Isom v. State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), where the jury,
in a manslaughter trial, deliberated from approximately 3:30 PM to
10:30 PM after 1 1/2 days of hearing the trial of the case, where
several jurors expressed a desire to recess deliberations, and
where the trial court sent the jury back for further deliberations,
at which time the jury returned a verdict in about 30 minutes, the
time for continuous deliberation was held to be excessive.
This court should hold as a matter of judicial administration
if not Constitutional law, that keeping a jury in deliberation
continuously for 13 1/2 hours after a full day of trial deprives
the Defendant of due process and fair trial by jury under the state
and federal Constitutions.

VII.
JURY INSTRUCTION 50 WAS UNDULY COERCIVE
DISSENTING JURORS TO COMPROMISE A CONVICTION.
The

instruction

deliberation

and

to

the

returning

jury

on

a unanimous

the

IN ENCOURAGING

matters

verdict

27
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of

their

included

the

following language:
A dissenting Juror should consider whether their state
of mind is a reasonable one, when it makes no impressions
on the minds of so many Jurors equally honest, equally
intelligent, who have heard the same evidence, with an
equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the sanction
of the same oath.
(Ct. Red. 417) (Addendum, Exhibit C ) .
The court should have given Defendant's proposed instructions,
p. 30 and 31 (Court Record 304 and 305) which present the duties
of the jury, particularly dissenting members, in a much less
coercive, and hence, fairer manner.

The language in the trial

court's instruction violated the Defendant's right to jury under
both the Federal and State Constitutions and is in derogation of
the A.B.A. Standards Relating to Trial, Section 5.4(a) which s€*ts
out

a

proper

deliberation.

instruction

to

the

(Addendum, Exhibit F) .

jury

before

they

begin

The court's instruction

improperly focuses on a dissenting juror at the very beginning of
deliberation, states perhaps incorrectly that the opinion of a
dissenting juror has made no impression on the other jurors, and
gives a directive, in the nature of a presumption, that all jurors
are to be regarded as equally honest and intelligent with equal
desire to arrive at the truth.
Such an Allen instruction, Allen v. United States, 164 U.S.
492, 17 S. Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896), has no place at the
beginning of deliberations and probably should not even be given
later in circumstances of a hung jury.

It encourages jurors with

an initial minority opinion to more readily surrender that opinion
and deprives the Defendant of the benefit of the convictions of
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each individual juror.
The Utah courts have not yet decided whether a trial court is
ever entitled to give an Allen-type instruction.

In State v.

Thomas, 777 P. 2d 445, the supplemental oral instructions didn't
come close and in State v. Medina, 738 P. 2d 1021 (Ut. 1987) no
objection was made to the supplemental instructions.

However,

Justice Zimmerman, in a concurring opinion in State v. Thomas, says
that the question of whether the giving of an Allen instruction is
proper under the Utah Constitution or should be permitted as a
matter of judicial administration remains open. (p. 451).

The

coercive instruction given here should be held to have been
improper under both state and federal law and not mere harmless
error, given the 13 1/2 hour deliberation of the jury.

VIII.
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF
AN AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON RICHARD ANDERSON.
The evidence of aggravated assault came solely from the
testimony

of

Richard

Anderson.

While

Defendant

denies his

allegations, this issue must be examined in light of his testimony.
He testified that he heard some noise outside his trailer, put on
his clothes, opened the door and saw a man some distance away on
the ground with four men around him, one of them being the
Defendant.

Although the distance from the door is not clear, the

man on the ground, Mike, was not just outside that door (T. 372:1417) but near the pallet at the door of a neighboring trailer (T.
373:23-374:1) and was between Anderson and the other four. (T.
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374:23-24). Anderson started to step out and Defendant pulled his
hand back with a crescent wrench in it, took one step, and said,
"Do you want some of it, too?"

Anderson stepped back in the

trailer. (T. 319:10-14).
Utah Criminal Code 76-5-103 provides, in relevant part, that
a person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault and uses
a dangerous weapon.

While conceding that a crescent wrench may

constitute a dangerous weapon, an assault has not been shown.
Of the three types of assault, the Defendant was charged in
the Information (Ct. Red. 3) (Addendum, Exhibit G) with alternative
(b) of 76-5-102 which provides:
(1) Assault is :
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another ...
The alleged conduct of the Defendant fails to establish "a
show of immediate force or violence".

This element necessarily

requires close proximity and an overt act on the Defendant's part.
See Am. Jur. 2d, Assault and Battery, Section 22. The Defendant's
conduct

in State v. Verdin, 595 P. 2d

distinguished

his conduct

862

(Ut. 1979) which

from that prohibited by 76-10-506,

Threatening With or Using Dangerous Weapon in Fight or Quarrel, was
that he attempted to pull the trigger of a firearm and declared an
intention to "smoke" the officer.

The conditional threat made at

a distance in the instant case while pulling back a hand with a
crescent wrench in it does not constitute "a show of immediate
force or violence" so as to distinguish it from the misdemeanor of
Threatening With a Dangerous Weapon under 76-10-506.
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IX.
IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE COURT TO ORDER AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT
TO REIMBURSE THE COUNTY FOR ALL COSTS OF DEFENSE INCLUDING
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Rules 7(4)(e) and 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide for appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant. Utah
Code 77-32a-3 provides that in determining costs, the court shall
take into consideration the financial resources of the Defendant
and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.
The court, after imposing a sentence of five years to life,
ordered the Defendant to pay all costs including attorney's fees
and restitution to the family of the deceased (T 953-955).

No

consideration was given to his lack of financial resources for the
foreseeable future in prison. Such a sentence constitutes an abuse
of discretion.

It seeks to impose such an extreme burden while

Defendant is in prison, or afterwards while on parole as to have
a chilling effect on the Defendant or any other Defendant seeking
appointment of counsel pursuant to their constitutional right to
representation.
This

case

is

to be

distinguished

probation where the Defendant has or

from

those

is expected

involving
to secure

employment after taking into account the Defendant's probable
ability to pay.

The order was contrary to the provisions of the

Utah Code and in derogation of his rights to counsel under the
state and federal Constitutions.
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CONCLUSION
This court should remand the case to district court for a new
trial on the homicide charge. The aggravated assault charge should
be reduced to the offense of Threatening With or Using Dangerous
Weapon in Fight or Quarrel or dismissed.

Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October, 1990.

Nathan Hult '
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee, R. Paul
Van Dam, Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on the^lst day of October, 1990.

Nathan Hult
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EXHIBIT 6
£70

1

MAYBE ALMOST BY THE BARREL.

2 IQ

ALL RIGHT.

SO WHAT DID YOU DO THEN?

3

A

I SAID ALL RIGHT, YOU KNOW, THE GUY STILL HAD HIM ON THE

4

GROUND.

5

Q

NOW, LET ME ASK YOU THIS:

6

A

I SAID, ALL RIGHT.

7

Q

WHO COULD YOU SEE AT THIS POINT IN TIME?

8

A

NOBODY.

9

IT'S DARK.

I WALKED BACK TOWARD THE TRAILER, THIS TRAILER
YOU SAID, ALL RIGHT.

I GOT THE KNIFE AWAY FROM HIM.

I WAS IN THE DARK.

BECAUSE, SEE, RIGHT HERE

10 0

OKAY.

11

A

THE ONLY LIGHT IN THIS TRAILER WAS ONE RIGHT IN THE

12

CENTER,

IT'S A SOFT BULB.

—

THE LIGHT —

BESIDES THE OTHER

13 LIGHTS IN THIS TRAILER THERE, THE LIGHT'S NEVER ON.
14

Q

15 A

OKAY.
NO.

DID YOU E\^ER SEE THESE LIGHTS ON?
I NEVER SEEN ANYBODY IN THAT TRAILER LOOK OUT

16

EITHER.

V

Q

OKAY.

18

A

I WENT BACK IN THE TRAILER.

19

AWAY FROM ME.

20

Q

OKAY.

21

A

YEAH, I HAD THE WRENCH.

22

YOU KNOW, THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE FABRICATING.

23

Q

24

RIGHT?

25

A

OKAY.

SO YOU SAID YOU HAD ENOUGH.

D I D YOU H A V E A N Y T H I N G

WHAT DID YOU DO?

I SAID, HEY, JUST KEEP HIM

WITH

YOU?

NOBODY HAD THE WRENCH -&3^- ME.

SO YOU GO BACK INTO TRAILER NUMBER THREE, IS THAT

YES.
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EXHIBIT C
INSTRUCTION NO.

<573

The Court instructs the Jury that although the verdict to
which each Juror agrees must, of course, be each Jurors own
conclusion, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of fellow
Jurors yet, in order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result the
Jurors should examine with candor the questions submitted to them,
with due regard and deference to the opinions of each other.

A

dissenting Juror should consider whether their state of mind is a
reasonable one, when it makes no impression on the minds of so nany
Jurors equally honest, equally intelligent

who have heard the name

evidence, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, under the
sanction of the same oath.

You are not to give up a conscientious

conclusion after you have reached such a conclusion finally, but it
is your duty to confer with your fellow Jurors carefully and
earnestly, and with a desire to do absolute justice both to the
State and to the Defendant.
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EXHIBIT b
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their
deliberations are a matter of considerable importance.
It is
rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room,
to make an emphatic expression of his opinion on the case or to
announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When one
does that at the outset, his sense or pride may be aroused, and he
may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it
is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates
in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the qualify of
your service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court,
not in the opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in
mind that you will make a definite contribution to efficient
judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict.
To that end, the Court would remind you that in your deliberations
in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration
of justice based thereon.
tlw/3/28

30
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EXHIBIT E
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED INSTRUCTION NO.
The State of Utah and the Defendant both are entitled to the
individual opinion of every juror. It is the duty of each of you
after considering all of the evidence in the case, to determine,
is possible, the question of guilt or innocence of the Defendant.
When you have reached a conclusion in respect, you should not
change it merely because one or more or all of your fellow jurors
may have come to a different conclusion.
However, each juror
should freely and fairly discuss with his fellow jurors the
evidence and the deduction to be drawn therefrom. If, after doing
so, any juror should be satisfied that a conclusion first reached
by him was wrong, he should abandon that original opinion and
render his verdict according to his final decision.
tlw/3/29

31
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EXHIBIT F
A.B.A. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY
5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court
may give an instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror
must agree thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching an
agreement, if it can be done without violence to
individual j udgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for
himself, but only after an impartial consideration of the
evidence with his fellow jurors'
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror
should not hesitate to reexamine his own views and change
his opinion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest
conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence
solely because of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been
unable to agree, the court may require the jury to
continue their deliberations and may give or repeat an
instruction as provided in subsection (a). The court
shall not require or threaten to require the jury to
deliberate for an unreasonable length of time or for
unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed
upon a verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable
probability of agreement.
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45 North First East
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Telephone: (801) 734-9464

EXHIBIT G

IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, BRIGHAM CITY DEPARTMENT
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DON WAYNE BROWN,
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah
DOB: 12/01/55

INFORMATION

RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTEAN,
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah
DOB: 11/21/64
BILLY DONALD CAYER,
ADDRESS: Salt Lake City, Utah
DOB: 05/12/43

Criminal No.

WILLIAM ROBERT CUMMINS,
ADDRESS: Philadelphia, PA
DOB: 12/25/60
Defendants.

The undersigned, DALE WARD

, under oath, states on

information and belief that the defendants at Box Elder County,
State of Utah, committed the crimes of:
COUNT I
MURDER IN THE 2nd DEGREE, A FELONY OF THE 1st DEGREE, AT: Box
Elder County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th and 26th, 1989,
IN VIOLATION OF Section 76-5-203, U.C.A. (1953, as amended),
TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID THE DEFENDANTS DID,
INTENDING TO CAUSE SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO Miguel Rameriz, COMMIT
AN ACT OR ACTS CLEARLY DANGEROUS TO HUMAN LIFE, THAT DI^afiJW<?^<V//^V>v * Y>
THE DEATH OFDigitized
Miguel
Rameriz,
OR
ACTING
UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES
by the Howard
W. Hunter Law
Library,
J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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INFORMATION - Page Two

EVIDENCING A DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE TO HUMAN LIFE, DID RJ^KOTSSLJ
ENGAGE IN CONDUCT WHICH CREATED A GRAVE RISK OF DEATH TO Miguel
Rameriz AND THEREBY CAUSED THE DEATH OF Miguel Rameriz.
COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County,
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT THE
DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip Cabutean DID ATTEMPT,
WITH UNLAWFUL FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie
Apodaca AND IN DOING SO DID EITHER INTENTIONALLY CAUSE SERIOUS
BODILY INJURY TO THE AFORESAID Eddie Apodaca OR DID USE A DEADLY
WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH OR SERIOUS
BODILY INJURY.
COUNT III
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County,
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT
THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip Cabutean DID
MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Sherman G. Galardo THROUGH THE
USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A KNIFE.
COUNT IV
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder County,
Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF Section
76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON OR ABOUT
THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Don Wayne Brown

DID MAKE

A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR VIOLENCE,
TO DO BODILYi INJURY TO Richard C. Anderson, THROUGH THE USE OF

A W&ffl

WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OB FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE DEATH

OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A CRESCENT WRENCH.
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INFORMATION - Page Three
COUNT V
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Don Wayne Brown DID
MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH THE USE
OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A KNIFE.
COUNT VI
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE FORCE OR
VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Sherman G. Galardo THROUGH THE
USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A WRENCH.
COUNT VII
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE
FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH
THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO PRODUCE
DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, NUMCHUCKS.
COUNT VIII
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A FELONY OF THE 3rd DEGREE, AT: Box Elder
County, Utah, ON OR ABOUT October 25th, 1989, IN VIOLATION OF
Section 76-5-103, U.C.A. (1953, as amended), TO WIT, THAT ON
OR ABOUT THE DATE AFORESAID, THE DEFENDANT Raymond Phillip
Cabutean DID MAKE A THREAT, ACCOMPANIED BY A SHOW OF IMMEDIATE
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FORCE OR VIOLENCE, TO DO BODILY INJURY TO Eddie Apodaca THROUGH
THE USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON OR SUCH MEANS OR FORCE LIKELY TO
PRODUCE DEATH OR SERIOUS BODILY INJURY, TO WIT, A WRENCH.

This information is based on evidence obtained from the
following witnesses:
SHERMAN G. GALARDO, ERIC TILLEY, RICHARD C. ANDERSON, EDDIE
APODACA, ROGER OLSEN, JIM SUMMERILL, LYNN YEATES, KENNY ADAMS,
DALE WARD, MIKE JOHNSON, LARRY/J^HNSTONi, GREG SHEPHERD, DR. GRAY,
COMPLAINANT

DALE WARD,

Subscribed
sworn to
me
usL'tiueu and
etna sworn
to before
ueLutt: uiu

is 7J7*& of /?*/-

thj

19 fr.

4l£~~±2ROBERT W. DAINES, CIRCUIT JUDGE
AUTHORIZED FOR PRESENTMENT
AND P1LIN6J
BOX ELDER COUNTY ATTORNEY
ROGER F. BARON, Digitized
DEPUTY
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